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The financing of Pakistan’s substantial current account deficits within the framework of
IMF and the World Bank structural adjustment programmes—about 6 per cent of GDP
in the early 1990s led to a debt crisis in the late 1990s. IMF considered this level of
current account deficit quite feasible in order to allow import liberalization, while the
country needed both internal as well as the external adjustment. IMF also frequently
demanded devaluation of the rupee against the US dollar to enhance exports. While
exports remained stagnant, the devaluation has directly added to the rupee value of
foreign debt resulting in a dramatic increase in debt service burden leading to debt
crisis, lower economic growth and higher poverty level in 1998. While devaluation was
supposed to boost exports and stimulate economic growth, it seems to have had a
recessionary impact on the economy by raising the cost of imported intermediate inputs.
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Thus, devaluation as an instrument for export promotion involves substantial costs
while its benefits are uncertain. Pakistan’s external debt as per cent of GNP is now
higher than all but the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs); its total debt service as
per cent of exports is considerably higher than all the countries, including the HIPCs, a
reflection of the country’s grave debt crisis. Although Pakistan qualifies for assistance
under the enhanced HIPC Initiative as per criterion of NPV of debt to exports, it has to
strive to meet other eligibility criteria. This criteria should be revised to broaden the
debt relief to countries whose debt problems are much severe than the HIPC countries.
Countries like Pakistan with poverty reduction strategies should be entitled to
immediate debt relief. For effective debt management, fiscal consolidation, including
tax reform to strengthen the fiscal payments capacity, is essential in achieving debt
sustainability. Attention should be given to eliminating the dependence on a very
narrow production and export base.
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1 Introduction
Like many other developing countries, Pakistan has also resorted to borrowing heavily
from foreign and domestic sources to finance its development plans, consequently
maintaining large fiscal deficits in past which became unsustainable in the late 1980s.
Heavy reliance on borrowings to finance fiscal as well as the current account deficits led
to an accumulation of debt, which grew from about Rs 155 billion in 1980s to Rs 802
billion in the 1990s. Total debt has almost doubled over the last five-year period and
now in 1999-200 stands at Rs 3,095.5 billion. As a result, the ratio of total debt to GDP
escalated from 88.5 per cent in 1995/6 to 97.5 per cent in 1999-2000.
Sustainability of external debt is closely related to external current account
sustainability. An examination of external debt burden in relation to current account
indicators shows that its sustainability is seriously affected over the last five years.
Stagnant export and foreign exchange earnings, together with heavy reliance on foreign
resources, were the main contributory factors in worsening the external debt indicators.
The ratio of external debt to exports earning deteriorated to 277 per cent over the last
five years—a level beyond the critical threshold of debt sustainability.
The paper examines the unsustainable debt burden and its impact upon poverty in
Pakistan. The organization of the paper is as follows: section 2 discusses the external
debt burden of Pakistan. Section 3 compares Pakistan’s debt burden with the other
developing countries including the heavily indebted poor countries. Section 4
investigates the causes of Pakistan’s debt crisis. Section 5 focuses on the revival of
economic growth and debt reduction, and section 6 discusses the enhanced HIPCs
Initiative and Pakistan’s eligibility for debt relief under the Initiative. Finally, section 7
draws some conclusions from the analysis.
2 External debt burden
Pakistan’s external debt is defined as the total debt that resident public and private
entities in the country contracted from nonresidents on a well-defined repayment
structure. It comprised of (i) public and publicly guaranteed debt; (ii) private non-
guaranteed credits; (iii) central bank deposits; and (iv) IMF loans. On the other hand,
foreign exchange liabilities are primarily held by residents with no structured repayment
schedule. In US dollar terms, Pakistan’s external debt amounted to 34.2 billion or 53.8
per cent of GDP at the end of 1999-2000 fiscal year (Table 1). Adding foreign exchange
liabilities of US$ 4.5 billion to the external debt, the total external liabilities will rise to
US$ 38.8 billion or 61 per cent of GDP. While external debt increased by 12 per cent
over the last five years, foreign exchange liabilities declined substantially by 36 per
cent, mainly due to a reduction in the stock of foreign currency accounts.
The external debt which has surpassed the domestic debt in 1995/6, increased1 rapidly
by Rs 560.8 billion or 57 per cent to Rs 1,536.7 billion between 1995/6 and 1999/2000.
While external debt in dollar terms grew by 12 per cent, the phenomenal growth of 57
per cent in rupee terms was attributed to the 11 per cent average annual depreciation of
the rupee against the US dollar demanded by the IMF to enhance exports over the last
five years. While export remained stagnant, mainly due to weak commodity prices and
1 See State Bank of Pakistan, Annual Report 20002
non-availability of exportable surplus, debt burden became unsustainable, resulting in
rescheduling in 1998-99.
Public and publicly guaranteed debt has been the dominant kind of external debt in
Pakistan for many decades. At fiscal year 1999/2000 (fiscal year 2000), it accounted for
85 per cent of total external debt (Table 2). However, the 1990s observed a significant
change in the composition of external debt as the share of private non-guaranteed debt
rose rapidly from 4.83 per cent in fiscal year 1995 to 10.45 per cent in fiscal year 1999.
Since a large share of public and publicly guaranteed external debt owed to official
creditors, the country’s external debt is typically long term, when classified by original
maturity. The 1990s witnessed a profound change in the composition of external debt.
The share of short- and medium-term external debt rose sharply from 10.7 per cent at
end 1990/1 to 22.1 per cent at end 1998/9 (Table 3). This accounts for the large increase
in total external debt between 1992/3 and 1998/9; notably the short-term debt and
external liabilities forced the country for rescheduling in 1998/9.
Table 1
Pakistan’s external liabilities (US$ millions)
FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000
I. Public and publicly guaranteed debt 26,228 26,501 27,182 27,088 26,904 29,179
A. Medium and long term (>1 year) 25,976 25,977 26,510 26,536 26,486 28,618
B. Short-term (• 1 year) 252 524 672 552 418 561
II. Private non-guaranteed debts 1,418 2,405 2,705 3,127 3,435 2,842
III. Central bank deposits 88 0 150 450 700 700
IV. IMF 1,630 1,535 1,316 1,415 1,825 1,550
Total external debt 29,364 30,441 31,353 32,080 32,864 34,271
V. Foreign exchange liabilities 7,764 9,299 11,011 1,760 4,315 4,587
Foreign currency accounts 6,575 8,305 9,844 1,507 2,269 2,349
FCAs prior to freeze 5,376 6,297 7,646 Frozen
FE-45 1,199 2,008 2,198 1,507 1,380 1,072
F E - 2 5 D e p o s i t s 0000 6 1 7 9 7 7
O u t s i d e S B P 0000 5 5 0 6 1 6
W i t h S B P ( F E 1 3 ) 0000 6 7 3 6 1
F E - 3 1 D e p o s i t s ( i n c r e m e n t a l ) 0000 2 7 2 3 0 0
Special US dollar bonds 0000 1 , 1 6 4 1 , 2 9 7
N a t i o n a l d e b t r e t i r e m e n t p r o g r a m m e0000 2 2 5 1 8 5
Others liabilities 600 500 753 253 657 756
FEBC 434 339 260
FCBC 132 147 149 Frozen
D B C 2 385
Total external liabilities (I to V) 37,128 39,740 42,364 33,840 37,179 38,858
External liabilities payable in rupees 8,500 3,391 1,720
Frozen FCAs 8,172 3,196 1,572
FEBC See foreign exchange 193 129 109
FCBC liabilities 131 63 36
DBC 433
Source: Statistics Department, State Bank of Pakistan.3
Table 2
Structure of external debt, Fiscal years 1995-2000 (% of total external debt)
FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000
I. Public and publicly guaranteed debt 89.32 87.06 86.70 84.44 81.86 85.14
A. Medium and long term (> 1 year) 88.46 85.34 84.55 82.72 80.59 83.51
B. Short-term (• 1 year) 0.86 1.72 2.14 1.72 1.27 1.64
II. Private non-guaranteed debts 4.83 7.90 8.63 9.75 10.45 8.29
III. Central bank deposits 0.30 0.00 0.48 1.40 2.13 2.04
IV. IMF 5.55 5.04 4.20 4.41 5.55 4.52
Total external debt 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Statistics Department, State Bank of Pakistan.
Table 3
Outstanding external debt and its growth
(US$ millions)
External debt Growth rates
Long term
Short/medium




















































29,456 3.2 -14.5 -0.7
Note: Figures in parentheses represent percentage shares in total.
Source: Statistics Department, State Bank of Pakistan.
Although the share of short- and medium-term external debt remained less than 20 per
cent of total external debt between 1990/1 to 1997/8, external debt were large enough to
contribute to external financial vulnerability, as the official foreign exchange reserves4
remained low during this period (Table 3). In addition, with increasing amounts of
scheduled debt service payments falling the next 12 months on long-and medium-term
public and private debt, the effective short-term debt rose rapidly, a fact which
contributed further to external the financial vulnerability of the economy resulting in
rescheduling in the late 1990s.
2.1 The debt service burden
External debt sustainability is concerned with the capacity of the borrowing country to
service its debt under conditions of respectable economic growth and macroeconomic
stability. However, these two conditions were nonexistent in Pakistan in the 1990s. As a
result, there was a dramatic increase in debt service burden of external debt. While
foreign exchange earning fluctuated around US$ 11-12 billion between 1995 and 2000,
the debt service burden (due before debt rescheduling) rose rapidly. As a result, debt
service to foreign exchange earning rose sharply from 27.5 per cent in 1994/5 to 41.4
per cent in 1997/8.
3 Cross-country comparison of Pakistan’s debt burden
A cross-country comparison of Pakistan’s debt burden is given in Table 4. The
indebtedness of selected Countries is compared as per cent of GNP and of exports to
reflect potential capacity to service debt. To take an account of the concessional element
of external borrowing, a comparison has also made in terms of the net present value of
external debt obligations which uses the appropriate rates of discount. The results of the
comparison are as follow:
- Pakistan’s external debt as per cent of GNP was clearly higher than all but the
heavily indebted countries in 1998. It was more than twice that of India and
Bangladesh and considerably higher than the average of low-income and developing
countries. The net present value of external debt as per cent of GNP follows the
same ranking;
- Pakistan’s external debt as per cent of exports was also clearly higher than all but
the heavily indebted countries. The net present value of external debt as per cent of
exports follows the same pattern;
- Pakistan’s total debt service as per cent of exports is considerably higher than all
countries including the heavily indebted countries, which reflects the gravity of the
country’s debt crisis. In 1998, its interest payment on external debt as per cent of
exports was 8 per cent compared with 7.4 per cent, and 5.4 per cent in low-income
and heavily indebted countries, respectively.
The above comparison shows that Pakistan’s debt crisis is largely attributed to the
heavy external debt service burden. An interesting point to note is that although
Pakistan’s debt service burden was higher than in most countries, debt stock ratios were,
in fact, significantly lower than the heavily indebted countries. This reflects the
country’s non-concessional public and private debt with shorter maturities and higher
interest rate relative to the heavily indebted countries. The less favorable debt structure5
in Pakistan is also evident from the fact that in 1997, the average grant element2 in the
debt of low-income countries was about 44 per cent, while it was only 21 per cent in
Pakistan. Likewise, the average maturity of Pakistan’s external debt was only 12 years


























India 172 147 24 20 21 –
Bangladesh 245 151 38 24 10 3
Sri Lanka 132 97 58 43 7 2
Pakistan 277 230 53 42 24 8
Developing country 146 133 17.6 38 20 7.4
Low-income country 273 – 47.9 – 17.8 7.4
HIPCs 386 249 121.5 84 13.9 5.4
Note: World Bank (2000a) understates the debt burden for Pakistan as it excludes some short-term
external debt. Including all such kind of debt, the external debt-to-export ratio comes to 400 per
cent for 1999-00, which is clearly higher than all country groups in the world.
Source: World Bank (2000a).
4 Causes of debt crisis
The financing of Pakistan’s substantial current account deficits in the early 1990s sowed
the seeds for its future debt problems. The current account deficit in the period 1990-99
was over US$ 25 billion or an average of 4.8 per cent of GDP. Treating resident foreign
currency deposits (RFCD) as borrowing rather than earnings, the cumulative current
account deficit during the above period was US$ 32 billion, or over 6 per cent of GDP,
a level not sustainable even with a very rapid growth of exports. Thus, the likelihood of
crisis was certain. However, IMF considered3 this level of current account deficit quite
viable for 1997/8. In fact, it was manifested in the IMF structural adjustment
programmes by putting too much emphasis on fiscal adjustment through demanding
management policies and ignoring the need to adjust external account deficit in order to
allow import liberalization in the country. The country needed both external and internal
adjustment during the last decade. The large current account deficit was financed
through foreign currency deposits and foreign investment in the energy sector with
guaranteed price for electricity sale, while the consequences of such financing on the
long-term balance of payment were mainly ignored. In addition, IMF frequently
demanded devaluation of the rupee against the US dollar to enhance exports. Exports
remained stagnant, and the devaluation has directly added to the rupee value of foreign
debt, resulting in the dramatic increase in debt service burden that led to the debt crisis
in 1998.
2 World Bank (2000a).
3 Government of Pakistan (2001).6
Table 5


































































































Year (US$ millions) Rs/US$ As % of GDP Growth rates
1972/3 766 891 8.2 9.6 17.8 1.3 1.1
1973/4 1020 1493 15.4 11.4 16.6 28.0 5.3 5.4 33.2 67.6
1974/5 978 2114 -1.2 8.6 18.7 27.3 10.0 9.4 -4.1 41.6
1975/6 1162 2139 0.0 8.8 16.1 24.9 7.4 6.2 18.8 1.2
1976/7 1132 2418 0.1 7.4 15.9 23.3 8.4 5.9 -2.6 13.0
1977/8 1283 2751 0.0 7.1 15.3 22.4 8.2 2.7 13.3 13.8
1978/9 1644 3816 0.0 8.3 19.2 27.5 11.0 5.0 28.1 38.7
1979/80 2341 4857 0.0 9.9 20.5 30.4 10.6 3.7 42.4 27.3
1980/1 2799 5563 -0.1 10.3 20.4 30.7 10.1 2.8 19.6 14.5
1981/2 2319 5769 0.1 7.1 17.6 24.7 10.5 3.4 -17.1 3.7
1982/3 2627 5616 28.2 9.2 19.6 28.8 10.4 0.6 13.3 -2.7
1983/4 2669 5993 6.1 8.6 19.2 27.8 10.7 2.2 1.6 6.7
1984/5 2457 6009 12.4 7.9 19.3 27.2 11.4 4.1 -7.9 0.3
1985/6 2942 5984 6.5 9.2 18.8 28.0 9.5 2.4 19.7 -0.4
1986/7 3498 5792 6.4 10.5 17.4 27.9 6.9 1.0 18.9 -3.2
1987/8 4362 6919 2.4 11.4 18.0 29.4 6.7 3.1 24.7 19.5
1988/9 4634 7207 9.2 11.6 18.0 29.6 6.4 3.4 6.2 4.2
1989/90 4926 7411 11.6 12.3 18.6 30.9 6.2 3.4 6.3 2.8
1990/1 5902 8385 4.6 13.0 18.4 31.4 5.5 3.0 19.8 13.1
1991/2 6762 8998 10.8 13.9 18.5 32.4 4.6 1.9 14.6 7.3
1992/3 6785 10049 4.5 13.1 19.4 32.5 6.3 6.4 0.3 11.7
1993/4 6685 8685 16.2 12.8 16.7 29.5 3.8 3.2 -1.5 -13.6
1994/5 7759 10296 2.3 12.7 16.9 29.6 4.2 3.5 16.1 18.5
1995/6 8311 12015 8.8 13.0 18.8 31.8 5.8 6.8 7.1 16.7
1996/7 8096 11241 16.2 12.8 17.8 30.6 5.0 5.6 -2.6 -6.4
1997/8 8434 10301 10.8 13.3 16.3 29.6 2.9 2.7 4.2 -8.4
1998/9 7570 9344 16.1 12.5 15.5 28.0 2.9 2.6 -10.2 -9.3
1999/2000* 8488 10033 3.2 13.3 15.7 29.0 2.6 2.3 12.1 7.4
Decade average, 1970s 1.8 9.0 17.8 26.8 8.9 5.1 18.6 27.2
Decade average, 1980s 8.8 10.1 18.5 28.6 8.4 2.7 8.5 4.4
Decade average, 1990s 9.9 13.0 17.3 30.3 4.2 3.9 4.5 2.7
Note: * Projected by the SBP.
Source: State Bank of Pakistan Annual Reports.
Ironically, in the late 1980s, the current account deficit of 4 per cent of GDP that the
country faced as a result of the declining demand for its exports because of the recession
in the industrial countries was considered quite unsustainable by the IMF. It is
noteworthy that in the late 1980s, the main source of deterioration in the current account
deficit was external, while in the 1990s it was internal, as the country was spending
beyond its means as result of import liberalization. However, since the late 1980s
external assistance was sought from the IMF and the World Bank to reduce the current7
account deficit, which they provided by formulating structural adjustment programmes
and placing policy conditionalities in these programmes. Along with many other policy
reforms, devaluation and trade liberalization have been the most important components
of adjustment programmes during the 1990s. These two major policy reforms have
turned out to be highly controversial not only in Pakistan but also in many other
developing countries. It is, therefore, important to examine the effects of these reforms
on the economy.
IMF argues that devaluation is a powerful tool for restructuring relative prices and
incentives. Devaluation raises the price of tradables and lowers the price of non-
tradables, and is expected to produce a contraction of imports and expansion of exports,
which is likely to improve the trade deficit. But the efficacy of devaluation depends on
the export supply and import demand elasticities. A sum of the elasticities greater than
one will bring an equilibrium in the trade balance. However, experience has shown that
these elasticities remained low in Pakistan as the economy is structurally
import-dependent, and export expansion needs more time and investment than
demonstrated by the proponents of devaluation. Hence, with low price and income
elasticities for Pakistan’s exports, devaluation led to reduced foreign currency earnings
and thus reduced level of investment, which constrained future foreign currency earning
capacity. Devaluation of the rupee also increased of the price of imported raw material
as well as machinery, which added to the production costs of non-tradable goods and
pushed up the price of domestically consumed goods. This eroded the anticipated gain
in the competitiveness of exports, again calling for another devaluation to improve
export competitiveness. Thus, each devaluation episode is ensued by inflation, and the
vicious circle of devaluation and inflation has not only worsened the trade balance but
has also resulted in an unsustainable debt burden and higher cost of external debt
servicing over the last decade.
Devaluation was supposed to restore export competitiveness and stimulate growth.
Instead, devaluation seems to have had a recessionary impact on the economy and
resulted in lower economic growth rate in 1990s than the 1980s (Table 8). In fact, by
raising the cost of imported intermediate inputs, the persistent devaluation of the rupee
against the dollar has had adverse supply effect. Alternatively, when devaluation is
accompanied by a rise in the domestic price level, as is often the case in Pakistan, it
erodes the purchasing power of money, which through a ‘real balance effect’ leads to a
decline in aggregate demand and thus ensue recession.
In addition, the country also pursued import liberalization within the framework of IMF
and the World Bank. Maximum tariff rates were brought down from 225 per cent in
1988 to 70 per cent in 1994/5, to 45 per cent in 1997, and finally to 35 per cent in
1998/9. In addition, domestic interest rates were liberalized and, as discussed above, the
rupee was devalued persistently to improve competitiveness of its exports. The lowering
of tariffs reduced the protection of the domestic industry, while liberalization of
domestic interest rates, together with the persistent round of depreciations, increased
domestic production costs. Consequently, growth of large-scale manufacturing
remained weak after liberalization and became negative in 1996/7, which resulted in a
higher loan default in the financial sector. As a result, in the country there are now
approximately 4,000 weak industrial units and Rs 263 billion as non-performing loans
(about 28 per cent of total advances).Table 6
Fiscal indicators as per cent of GDP, 1979/80 to 1999/2000
Revenue collection as percentage of GDP Expenditure as percentage of GDP

















































































































































1979/80 16.4 13.9 2.2 11.8 4.5 1.0 5.4 0.3 0.7 2.6 6.8 23.2 15.1 5.4 2.2 3.0 1.3 0.5 2.7 8.1
1980/1 16.9 14.0 2.5 11.3 4.4 1.0 5.1 0.4 0.7 2.9 6.0 22.9 14.5 5.5 2.1 1.9 1.0 0.6 3.3 8.4
1981/2 16.0 13.3 2.6 10.5 4.2 1.0 4.7 0.6 0.7 2.8 5.9 21.9 13.7 5.7 2.4 0.8 1.1 0.8 3.0 8.2
1982/3 16.2 13.5 2.4 10.9 4.3 1.0 5.1 0.8 0.6 2.8 7.7 23.9 15.8 6.4 3.1 0.8 1.1 0.6 4.0 8.1
1983/4 16.1 12.8 2.1 11.7 3.8 1.1 5.1 1.1 0.6 3.3 7.7 23.8 17.1 6.4 3.4 1.1 1.4 0.7 4.2 6.7
1984/5 16.4 13.0 1.9 10.9 3.3 1.0 4.9 1.1 0.6 3.4 8.3 24.7 17.7 6.7 3.5 1.1 1.4 2.2 2.7 7.0
1985/6 17.5 14.1 1.9 12.1 3.0 1.0 5.7 1.8 0.6 3.4 8.7 26.1 18.4 6.9 3.8 1.1 1.4 2.4 2.7 7.7
1986/7 18.1 14.5 1.8 11.9 2.7 1.0 5.4 2.3 0.5 3.7 8.5 26.6 20.3 7.2 4.2 1.0 1.8 2.7 3.4 6.3
1987/8 17.3 13.8 1.7 12.0 2.6 1.3 5.6 1.9 0.6 3.5 9.4 26.7 19.8 7.0 4.9 1.2 1.3 2.6 2.9 6.9
1988/9 18.1 14.3 1.7 12.4 2.6 1.9 5.5 1.9 0.5 3.7 8.1 26.1 19.9 6.6 5.0 1.7 1.3 2.5 2.7 6.3
1989/90 18.6 14.0 1.7 12.1 2.7 1.8 5.9 1.1 0.5 4.6 7.3 25.9 19.3 6.9 5.5 1.1 1.4 2.4 2.2 6.5
1990/1 16.1 12.7 1.9 10.7 2.5 1.7 5.0 1.2 0.4 3.4 9.5 25.6 19.2 6.3 4.9 1.0 1.3 2.8 2.8 6.4
1991/2 18.1 13.6 2.1 11.1 2.5 1.7 5.1 1.2 0.5 4.6 8.4 26.5 19.0 6.3 5.2 0.7 1.5 3.8 1.7 7.5
1992/3 17.9 13.3 2.6 10.5 2.7 1.8 4.7 0.9 0.4 4.6 8.1 26.0 20.3 6.5 5.9 0.5 1.5 4.1 1.8 5.7
1993/4 17.2 13.2 2.6 10.4 2.2 1.9 4.1 1.7 0.5 4.0 6.0 23.2 18.7 5.8 5.8 0.3 1.6 3.6 1.5 4.5
1994/5 16.9 13.7 3.4 10.3 2.4 2.3 4.1 1.1 0.5 3.2 5.9 22.8 18.4 5.6 5.2 0.3 1.8 3.7 1.8 4.4
1995/6 17.2 14.3 3.7 10.5 2.4 2.3 4.2 1.2 0.5 2.9 7.0 24.2 19.8 5.6 6.2 0.5 2.2 3.5 1.8 4.4
1996/7 15.6 13.2 3.5 9.7 2.3 2.3 3.5 1.1 0.5 2.4 6.4 22.0 18.5 5.2 6.6 0.5 1.9 3.0 1.4 3.5
1997/8 16.0 13.2 3.9 9.3 2.3 2.0 2.8 1.6 0.6 2.8 7.6 23.7 19.8 5.1 7.6 0.3 2.3 3.2 1.4 3.9
1998/9 16.3 14.1 3.9 10.2 2.1 2.5 2.2 2.7 0.6 2.3 6.0 22.4 19.0 4.9 7.7 0.7 2.2 2.8 0.7 3.4
1999/2000 16.4 13.3 4.0 9.3 2.0 3.4 2.2 1.2 0.6 3.1 5.8 22.2 19.0 4.5 7.7 0.8 2.1 3.2 0.8 3.2
89
Table 7
Poverty trends in Pakistan, Headcount
Years Overall Pakistan Rural Urban
1963-64 40.24 38.94 44.53
1966-67 44.50 45.62 40.96
1969-70 46.50 49.11 38.76
1979 30.68 32.51 25.94
1984-85 24.47 25.87 21.17
1987-88 17.32 18.32 14.99
1990-91 22.11 23.59 18.64
1992-93 22.40 23.35 15.50
1996-97 31.00 32.00 27.00
1998-99 32.60 34.80 25.90
Source: Amjad and Kemal (1997); Qureshi and Arif (1999).
Tariff reduction as part of IMF adjustment programmes has not only adversely affected
the large-scale manufacturing sector, but has also resulted in a considerable loss of
government revenue. Revenue from custom duty declined sharply from 5.9 per cent of
GDP in 1989/90 to 2.2 per cent in 1998/9, increasing the country’s reliance on revenue
from domestic taxes such as general sales tax (Table 6). However, the revenue increase
achieved through sales tax was not sufficient to compensate for the trade taxes lost over
the period. The loss of revenue from trade taxes subsequently forced the government, in
order to finance the fiscal deficit, to borrow further from domestic and external sources.
Consequently, the ratio of domestic debt to GDP rose from 43 per cent in 1988/9 to 49
per cent in 1999/2000. The deteriorating resource position forced the government
towards short-term borrowing from external sources. These developments, together with
persistent devaluation of domestic currency, worsened the external debt-to-GDP ratio.
External debt as per cent of GDP increased rapidly from 34 per cent in 1990/1 to 52.6
per cent in 1998/9. Consequently, the rapid growth of both internal and external debt
resulted in a high debt servicing ratio—87 per cent of total tax revenue, or 7.7 per cent
of GDP in 1998/9 (Table 6).
The government was initially able to reduce the budget deficit by 2 percentage points of
GDP in 1993/4. But stabilization was short-lived. Major slips in policy implementation
occurred in the form of a proliferation of tax exemptions and concessions leading to the
implementation of further stabilization measures in the next financial year. Repeated
attempts to stabilize the economy in the 1990s without the accompanying structural
reforms pushed the economy in a vicious circle. Although the government resorted to
raising taxes in an effort to reduce the budget deficit, increased tax rates on shrinking
tax base led to a further decrease of the taxbase through tax evasion and an expansion of
the underground economy. The stagnant tax-to-GDP ratio, together with rising debt
servicing, resulted in a cut in development expenditure to reduce the budget deficit.
Thus, development expenditure declined persistently throughout the reform period,
adversely affecting economic growth rate and inducing higher unemployment and
poverty levels (Tables 7 and 8). The poverty level is almost doubled4 over the past ten
years. The country now spends on debt servicing more than twice the amount earmarked
for development and the social sector. Without a doubt, the country is in a debt trap.
High debt servicing has resulted in lower investment and growth which, in turn, has
































































































































As % of GDP %
1970/1 1.2 -3.1 6.4 6.2 4.9 5.7 - 6.7 1.7
1971/2 2.3 3.5 1.2 -0.5 5.1 -0.2 4.7 - 3.8 2.0
1972/3 6.8 1.7 8.7 9.2 5.2 3.0 9.7 3.6 1.1 1.9
1973/4 7.5 4.2 6.4 6.1 5.4 4.2 30.0 5.2 5.4 1.8
1974/5 3.9 -2.1 0.5 -1.6 5.7 0.9 26.7 9.3 9.4 1.7
1975/6 3.3 4.5 1.4 -0.6 5.7 1.4 11.7 9.5 6.2 2.2
1976/7 2.8 2.5 1.8 -0.2 3.2 1.0 9.2 8.5 5.9 2.6
1977/8 7.7 2.8 10.2 10.9 8.5 7.3 6.9 7.8 2.7 3.1
1978/9 5.5 3.1 8.0 7.9 5.8 2.9 11.2 8.8 5.0 3.6
1979/0 7.3 6.6 10.3 11.0 5.7 4.0 11.2 6.8 3.7 3.6
1980/1 6.4 3.7 10.6 11.5 6.6 2.2 13.9 6.0 2.8 3.7
1981/2 7.6 4.7 13.8 15.7 7.9 2.9 11.1 5.9 3.4 3.8
1982/ 6.8 4.4 7.0 6.6 9.2 6.2 4.7 7.7 0.6 3.9
1983/4 4.0 -4.8 7.9 7.7 7.6 1.1 7.3 7.7 2.2 3.9
1984/5 8.7 10.9 8.1 8.0 8.2 3.0 5.7 8.3 4.1 3.7
1985/6 6.4 6.0 7.6 7.3 5.8 2.5 4.4 8.7 2.4 3.6
1986/7 5.8 3.3 7.5 7.2 5.9 1.6 3.6 8.5 1.0 3.1
1987/8 6.4 2.7 10.0 10.6 6.8 1.6 6.3 9.4 3.1 3.1
1988/9 4.8 6.9 4.0 2.4 3.8 1.4 10.4 8.1 3.4 3.1
1989/90 4.6 3.0 5.7 4.7 4.5 1.6 6.0 7.3 3.4 3.1
1990/1 5.6 5.0 6.2 5.4 5.2 4.6 12.7 9.5 3.0 6.2
1991/2 7.7 9.5 8.1 7.9 6.8 4.1 10.6 8.4 1.9 5.9
1992/3 2.3 -5.3 5.4 4.1 4.6 -0.8 9.8 8.1 6.4 4.7
1993/4 4.5 5.2 5.5 4.3 4.2 0.9 11.3 6.0 3.2 4.8
1994/5 5.3 6.6 3.6 1.5 4.8 3.0 13.0 5.9 3.5 5.4
1995/6 6.8 11.7 4.8 3.1 5.0 1.5 10.8 7.0 6.8 5.4
1996/7 1.9 0.1 1.3 -2.1 3.6 -1.6 11.8 6.4 5.6 6.1
1997/8 4.3 3.8 -1.6 7.6 3.2 -1.4 7.8 7.6 2.7 6.1
1998/9 3.2 2.0 4.2 3.7 4.1 0.4 5.7 6.0 2.6 6.1
1999/2000 4.5 5.5 1.6 0.0 4.5 2.8 3.4 5.8 2.3 6.1
Decade averages:
1970s 4.8 2.4 5.5 4.8 5.5 2.7 12.7 7.4 5.0 2.4
1980s 6.1 4.1 8.2 8.2 6.6 2.4 7.3 7.8 2.6 3.5
1990s 4.6 4.4 3.9 3.6 4.6 1.4 9.7 7.1 3.8 5.7
1988-2000 4.6 4.5 4.1 3.6 4.5 1.4 9.4 7.2 3.7 5.3
Source: Government of Pakistan (2000).
limited the capacity to service debt, forcing a further rescheduling of external debt in
2001. The above adverse outcome is reflection of the fact that the country adapted
import liberalization very rapidly. Maximum tariff rates were reduced from 225 per cent
to 70 per cent within a relatively short period of time to meet the IMF conditionalities,
while largely ignoring the adverse effects. With the country’s high protection levels, the11
cost of adjustment was considerable in terms of loss of output and employment
compared to the benefits gained through trade liberalization.
On the whole, policy failure was caused mainly by neglecting the consequences of
financing large current account deficits on the long-term balance of payment. The real
problem, however, was associated with poor economic management, excessive reliance
on the external resources used to finance consumption rather than investment, neglect of
domestic saving, and ineffective use of borrowed resources. In addition, reliance on
foreign savings further deepened as a consequence of the IMF/World Bank adjustment
programmes in the 1990s. As a result, the saving investment gap was higher in 1990s
than the 1980s (Table 9). Thus, the debt crisis was inevitable, given the large current
account deficit and the growing need to finance imports through external resources.
Table 9
Savings-investment gap
Savings Investment S-I Gap Savings Investment S-I Gap
Years (in millions of rupees) As % of GDP
1972/3 7,213 8,647 -1,434 10.7 12.8 -2.1
1973/4 6,179 11,614 -5,435 7.0 13.2 -6.2
1974/5 6,655 18,218 -11,563 6.0 16.4 -10.4
1975/6 14,672 24,057 -9,385 11.3 18.5 -7.2
1976/7 18,451 28,856 -10,405 12.3 19.3 -6.9
1977/8 25,525 31,505 -5,980 14.5 17.9 -3.4
1978/9 23,847 34,876 -11,029 12.9 18.9 -6.0
1979/80 32,060 43,345 -11,285 13.7 18.5 -4.8
1980/1 42,070 52,207 -10,137 15.1 18.8 -3.6
1981/2 46,254 62,447 -16,193 14.3 19.3 -5.0
1982/3 61,947 68,462 -6,515 17.0 18.8 -1.8
1983/4 63,220 76,701 -13,481 15.1 18.3 -3.2
1984/5 61,056 86,525 -25,469 12.9 18.3 -5.4
1985/6 76,608 96,545 -19,937 14.9 18.8 -3.9
1986/7 97,195 109,540 -12,345 17.0 19.1 -2.2
1987/8 92,062 121,666 -29,604 13.6 18.0 -4.4
1988/9 108,398 145,570 -37,172 14.1 18.9 -4.8
1989/90 121,514 162,076 -40,562 14.2 18.9 -4.7
1990/1 144,773 193,447 -48,674 14.2 19.0 -4.8
1991/2 206,809 244,059 -37,250 17.1 20.1 -3.1
1992/3 182,004 277,744 -95,740 13.6 20.7 -7.1
1993/4 246,205 305,477 -59,272 15.7 19.4 -3.8
1994/5 269,872 346,508 -76,636 14.3 18.4 -4.1
1995/6 249,842 403,417 -153,575 11.7 18.8 -7.2
1996/7 286,074 436,043 -149,969 11.6 17.7 -6.1
1997/8 385,029 468,008 -82,979 14.1 17.1 -3.0
1998/9 363,588 446,872 -83,284 12.0 14.8 -2.8
Source: Government of Pakistan (2000).12
5 Reviving economic growth and reducing debt burden
In designing a debt reduction strategy, it should be kept in mind that the plan can be
successful only if the fundamental causes that triggering the debt build-up, and
subsequent lower growth rate and higher poverty level have been addressed properly.
These fundamental causes include financing of substantial current account deficits and
persistent devaluation of domestic currency in the 1990s, weak macroeconomic
management, inconsistent implementation of policy reforms and poor governance, as
well as external factors such as worsening terms of trade. Thus, there is a need to adopt
an integrated approach that focuses on recovery of economic growth, poverty reduction,
and reduction in stock of debt as well as the debt servicing. The broad policy framework
for the revival of economic growth and poverty reduction should consist of the
following aspects: (i) macroeconomic policies, including monetary, fiscal and exchange
rates policies which, with timely adjustment in the face of economic shocks, provide a
stable environment for economic activity; (ii) structural policies, including trade, tax
and sector policies and regulatory environments which affect incentives for private
investment and production; (iii) public sector management, whereby public sector
institutions provide services complementary to private initiatives such as infrastructure
and social services; (iv) governance and market institution, including the rule of law and
reduction of corruption, and (v) social inclusion, which emphasizes full participation of
the society through social services that reach the poor.
For effective debt management, fiscal consolidation—including tax reform to strengthen
the fiscal payments capacity—is essential in achieving debt sustainability. Prudent
budgeting and reorienting of expenditures from nonproductive to growth-enhancing
activities within a medium-term framework are important to achieve a fiscal sustainable
fiscal position.
The design of trade policy reforms is also an important factor in performance failure.
Trade liberalization should not be pursued rapidly as an end onto itself. The previous
section shows that the fast lowering of tariffs as a component of IMF adjustment
programmes has not only resulted in a considerable loss of revenue, but has also
adversely affected large-scale manufacturing sector. As Pakistan’s experience shows, if
carried out in such a manner that the country is not ready or able to cope, or that it faces
unfavourable conditions, trade liberalization can contribute to a vicious cycle of trade
and balance of payment deficits, financial instability, debt and recession.
The failure of the WTO’s Seattle Round has changed the perception of and attitude
towards liberalization. Developing countries were generally discontented about their
non-benefits from the conclusion of Uruguay Round and the WTO agreements. The
main problems include (i) tariff peaks remaining in effect in the rich countries for many
industrial products exported by the developing countries; (ii) no gains having been
achieved as yet from the supposed phasing out of the textiles quotas; (iii) increase in
non-tariff barriers such as anti-dumping measures in the developed countries; (iv)
continued high protection in agriculture in rich countries; (v) implementation problems
of Uruguay Round and developing countries concerns related to the negative effects of
the Agriculture, TRIM and TRIPS agreements. Many developing countries argued that
some of the rules are imbalance and inequitable, generating problems and, therefore,
need to be reviewed. Trade policy should take an account of the weaknesses of the
various agreements and an assessment should be carried out before implementation to
determine how the economy would be affected by the trade reforms.13
However, one of the fundamental causes of stagnating exports is the worsening terms of
trade. The economy is dependent on a very narrow production and export base with
three main items—textile yarn and fibre, clothing, cereal and cereal-based products.
These account for more than 70 per cent of exports. Such a narrow export base creates
exceptional vulnerability to external shocks, one of the main reasons for lower export
earnings over the last decade. Diversification of the export base is essential to avoid
terms of trade shocks.
6 Enhanced HIPC Initiatives and Pakistan’s eligibility
Many poor countries, similarly to Pakistan, also faced increasing difficulty in making
payments on their debts in the 1980s and 1990s following the structural adjustment
programmes within the framework of IMF and the World Bank. Besides domestic
factors such as high fiscal and current account deficits and low saving rate, external
factors—oil price shocks, high interest rates, recession in the industrial countries, and
weak commodity prices—were major factors contributing to the debt build-up. Despite
debt rescheduling exercises, new official assistance, and policy package, the debt of the
poor countries remains high. To provide a comprehensive solution to this heavy
indebtedness, the IMF and the World Bank announced the HIPC Initiative in 1996.
The Initiative is aimed at making poor countries’ debt service burdens manageable
through a combination of sound policies, generous debt relief, and new inflows of aid.
Eligibility for receiving debt relief is limited to those countries that are eligible for ID
loans, have established strong track records of performance under programmes
supported by the IMF and the World Bank, and those that are not expected to achieve
external debt sustainability even after the full use of traditional debt-relief mechanisms
( s u c ha st h eP a r i sC l u b ’ sN a p l e sT e r m s ) .
A key indicator of external debt sustainability used in the Initiative is the ratio of the net
present value (NPV) of debt to exports. Until the fall of 1999, assistance was provided
to bring the NPV of debt after traditional mechanisms within the range of 200 to 250 per
cent of exports. The target NPV debt-to-export ratio within this range for a qualifying
country was determined using country-specific vulnerability factors. These include the
concentration and variability of export earnings, the fiscal burden of external debt
service, external debt in relation to GDP, the resource gap, level of international
reserves, and the burden of private sector debt.
But progress under the HIPC Initiative did not meet expectations. The Initiative was,
therefore, enhanced in October 1999 to include a reduction of targets and thresholds;
modified performance requirements, and a strengthening of the link between debt relief
and poverty reduction. The modified thresholds are 150 per cent of NPV of the debt-to-
exports ratio and a debt service ratio of 15-20 per cent. For very open economies (with
openness measured as 30 per cent of exports to GDP and fiscal indicator as 15 per cent
revenue to GDP), the fiscal window of the threshold was lowered from 280 per cent to
250 per cent of NPV of debt to revenue.
Amongst the heavily indebted countries, 22 HIPCs have already reached their decision
points. The enhanced HIPC Initiative would bring down the NPV of debt-to-exports
ratio of these countries from 260 per cent in 1999 to 126 per cent in 2003, below the14
average (128) for all non-HIPC developing countries and well below the critical
threshold of 150 per cent that caused the sharp increase in the incidence of debt
rescheduling in the past. The average terms of debt will be more favorable and, in
coming years, eligible HIPCs are expected to have their debt service-to-exports ratios
reduced to less than half that of the developing countries in general. Combined with
traditional relief and likely additional bilateral debt forgiveness, the HIPCs Initiative is
expected to reduce the debt stock of these countries by almost two-thirds from US$ 53
billion in net present value terms to about US$ 20 billion. It seems that the HIPCs are
likely to benefit greatly from enhanced HIPCs Initiative and thus would resolve their
debt problems within a relatively short period of time.
As indicated in the previous section, Pakistan’s external debt in 1998 both as per cent of
GNP and of exports was significantly higher than all but the heavily poor indebted
countries. Compared to all country groups, Pakistan’s debt service problem is more
severe and its total debt service as per cent of exports is considerably higher than all
other countries, including the heavily indebted countries. In this situation, it is important
to explore the country’s prospects for debt relief under the enhanced HIPC Initiative.
Pakistan’s net present value of external debt as per cent of exports is 230 per cent, while
the debt service-to-export ratio is 24 per cent (Table 4). Both of these ratios are clearly
above the external debt sustainability threshold of 150 per cent of NPV of the debt-to-
export ratio and the debt service ratio of 15-20, defined under the enhanced HIPC
Initiative. Thus, according to this criteria, the country qualifies for assistance under the
Initiative.
Other criteria are (i) the adoption of a poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) through
a broad-based participatory process by the decision point; and (ii) good progress in
implementing this strategy for at least one year by completion point. In this context,
Pakistan has already launched a poverty reduction programme in the year 2000, which
will increase economic opportunities for the poor, ensure their empowerment and access
to physical and social assets leading to welfare improvement. In contrast to the
approaches adopted in past when poverty reduction was considered as a by-product of
the growth process, the country undertook a major policy shift to bring it to centre stage
of economic policymaking. Under this approach, direct anti-poverty programmes have
been integrated in the macroeconomic framework. The focus is on small public works in
the poorest low-income urban and rural areas where these are expected to have a greater
impact on poverty. In the poorest rural areas the programme includes the development
of farm-to-market roads, de-silting of canals, construction of ponds and soil
conservation. In the poorest urban areas, schemes for improving water supply and
sewerage, and garbage collection and disposal are to be included. This will generate
significant employment for the poor and have a positive effect on their income and
living standards. The government has also scaled up the food support programme to five
times the size of its earlier version. Under the programme, 1.26 million poor households
with income less than Rs 2,000 per month will receive Rs 2,000 per annum to buy
wheat flour.
In August 2000, the government also announced its to establish a micro-finance bank to
enhance the access of the country’s millions of poor to credit for income generation and
employment promotion. The bank would operate on non-profit and cost-recovery basis,
and plans to extend credit ranging from Rs 5,000 to Rs 30,000 to around 100,000 poor15
persons in the small communities by December 2001. Overall, the lending programme
will cover 30 per cent women and beneficiaries will directly get the loans.
However, even though the government is making an effort at poverty reduction, the
challenge of meeting external financing remains. Exceptional assistance from IMF,
World Bank and bilateral donors, privatization receipts and non-interest current account
surpluses will be needed to meet debt service payments and to increase foreign
exchange reserve to satisfactory levels. The government’s debt management committee
has estimated the resources required to meet external financing for the period July
2000-June 2004 (Table 10). In contrast to the 1990s, when the country maintained
average annual resource deficits of US$ 1.5 billion or 3 per cent of GDP, it will have to
generate an annual of about US$ 1 billion in the non-interest current account balance of
payments over 2000-04 or 1.5 per cent of GDP. This will need a major export expansion
and considerable import saving. Furthermore, efforts are required to bring in at least
US$ 3 billion from privatization sales to foreigners. In addition, the country will need
US$ 6 billion in exceptional assistance from the IMF (mainly under poverty reduction
and growth facility [PRGF]), World Bank and ADB and debt rescheduling totaling
about US$ 5 billion. If these flows do not materialize, the country will not be able to
meet its debt obligations. However, the country should explore debt relief under the
enhanced HIPCs Initiative, which provides more favourable terms than debt
rescheduling, as the grant element is high in this assistance.
Currently, an IMF standby arrangement, which ends September 2001, is in effect in
Pakistan. Most criteria on key performance stipulated by the programme have largely
been met, and the country is planning to start negotiations for assistance under PRGF. If
the negotiations are successful, the country should seek debt relief under HIPCs
Initiative, which would bring down Pakistan’s NPV of debt-to-exports ratio from 230
per cent to 150 per cent, the external debt sustainability threshold, within the next three
years. Assuming a constant growth rate of NPV of debt and exports, it can be simulated
that the country will qualify for assistance totalling about US$ 6.6 billion under the
HIPCs Initiative. Thus, the country could reduce its debt burden to a sustainable level
within a relatively short period of time.
Table 10
Illustrative scenario of the sources and uses of foreign exchange
July 2000-June 2004
(in billions of US$)
Sources Uses
Non-Interest current account surplus 3.8 Debt service payments 20.6
Normal disbursement of medium- and long-
term loans 6.2
Net foreign private investment 2.5 Increase foreign exchange reserves 3.8
Rescheduling from Paris Club and non-
consortium debt countries 5.1
Privatization proceeds 3
Exceptional quick disbursing assistance
from IMF/World Bank/ADB 6
Trade finance 0.3
Least possible shortfalls -2.3
Total 24.4 24.4
Source: Government of Pakistan (2001).16
7 Concluding remarks
The paper examined the gravity of the debt problem in Pakistan. The heavily reliance on
foreign resources, especially on short-term loans following the structural adjustment
programmes within the framework of the IMF and the World Bank in the 1990s, has
contributed to the external financial vulnerability, debt, and recession that precipitated
debt rescheduling in 1998/9. The IMF frequently demanded the devaluation of the
domestic currency against the US dollar to enhance exports over the last decade. While
exports remained stagnant, mainly due to weak commodity prices and non-availability
of exportable surplus, the devaluation of the rupee against the US dollar has directly
added to the rupee value of foreign debt, causing the dramatic increase in debt service
burden. This, in turn, has crowded out development expenditure and resulted in lower
economic growth and higher poverty levels. Thus, devaluation as an instrument for
export promotion involves substantial costs while its benefits are uncertain. The
experience of Pakistan suggests that if trade liberalization is carried out in such a
manner that a country is not ready or able to cope, or faces conditions that are
unfavorable, liberalization can contribute to financial instability and debt and recession.
Before liberalizing the trade regime, it is important to examine the quality, timing,
sequencing and scope of liberalization (especially import liberalization), and whether
the process is accompanied by other factors such as the strengthening of local
enterprises and farms, human resource and technological development as well as the
build-up of export capacity and markets.
The analysis suggests that there was a policy failure triggered mainly by the neglect of
the consequences of large current account deficits. Not only the government, but also
the IMF and the World Bank were too optimistic with regard to export promotion
through the rapid opening-up of the trade regime and the frequent use of devaluation as
an instrument to enhance export competitiveness. Thus, the blame should be shared
equally and compensation be made in the form of debt forgiveness and debt relief on
highly concessional terms.
In designing a debt reduction strategy, it is imperative to address the fundamental causes
that triggered the debt build-up, and the subsequent adverse effects on economic growth
and poverty levels. There is need to adopt an integrated approach that focuses on the
recovery of economic growth, poverty reduction, and reduction in stock of debt as well
as the debt servicing. For effective debt management, fiscal consolidation, which also
includes tax reform to strengthen the fiscal payments capacity, is essential in achieving
debt sustainability. Attention should also be given to eliminating the dependency on a
very narrow production and export base. Diversification of the exports is the best
insurance against terms of trade shocks.
Pakistan’s external debt service problem is more severe as compared to all other
countries, including the HIPCs, thus reflecting the gravity of country’s debt crisis.
Although the country qualifies for assistance under the enhanced HIPC Initiative, given
its ratio of NPV of debt to exports, it has to adopt the poverty reduction strategy paper
to comply with the eligibility criteria for HIPC debt relief. The requirement of adopting
a PRSP involves long, complex and comprehensive planning; debt reduction, on the
other hand, is urgently needed to free up resources to meet the basic needs of the poor.
These two processes should be made parallel so as to provide immediate debt relief to
countries like Pakistan whose debt problems are much more severe than the HIPC
countries. Countries, like Pakistan, with viable poverty reduction strategies should be17
entitled to immediate debt relief. The eligibility criteria for debt relief should be shifted
away from the traditional emphasis on balance of payments indicators and other
financial criteria towards greater emphasis on the use of social performance indicators.
Pakistan is pursuing a poverty reduction programme, which can gain further momentum
if foreign assistance on concessional terms is made available. The availability and
efficient use of foreign resources, in addition to the terms and conditions under which
the foreign financing is obtained, are crucial to maintain a sustainable debt situation for
growth prospects and poverty reduction in Pakistan.
Foreign direct investment is one of the important sources of additional finance.
However, despite strong need for private sector inflows, the country has not been able to
attract foreign investors in the past. The challenge for Pakistan is to establish a climate
favourable to private investors—both for domestic and foreign. But even with strong
private sector growth, a sizable part of development expenditure will remain to be
financed externally by the government. To secure the financing needed for development
and poverty reduction, concerted efforts are required from the creditors and donors as
well as the government. Finally, the paper does not argue against debt rescheduling, but
that alternatives should be explored in order to achieve external debt sustainability with
faster and deeper debt reduction along with the revival of economic growth and poverty
reduction in Pakistan.
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